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This study investigates whether board ethnic diversity is associated with stronger board
monitoring outcomes. We explore a range of outcomes – CEO compensation, account-
ing misstatements, CEO turnover–performance sensitivity and acquisition performance
– but ﬁnd no evidence to support this. We also ﬁnd no evidence that board ethnic diversity
improves overall ﬁrm performance, even for those ﬁrms with higher agency problems. Our
results are robust across different methodologies and have important practical implica-
tions, by informing the current public policy debate on board ethnic diversity.
Introduction
Since the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 there has been an
increased call for diversity on corporate boards, re-
ﬂecting a frequently made claim that lack of diver-
sity was partly to blame for the crisis. For example,
the UK Corporate Governance Code states that:
Essential to the effective functioning of any board is
dialogue which is both constructive and challenging.
The problems arising from ‘group-think’ have been
exposed in particular as a result of the ﬁnancial crisis.
One of the ways in which constructive debate can be
encouraged is through having sufficient diversity on
the board. This includes, but is not limited to, gender
and race. (Financial Reporting Council, 2016, p. 2)
The argument that gender and ethnic diversity will
improve the key board role of oversight or moni-
toring of executive management has been made in
many quarters. For example, the institutional in-
vestor TIAA-CREF invests on this basis, arguing
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that ‘a diverse board is less likely to be beholden
to management’ (Carleton, Nelson and Weisbach,
1998, p. 1343), whilst board diversity proponents
have argued that diverse directors are individually
stronger monitors (e.g. Ramirez, 2004).
Board gender diversity has received by far the
most attention from academia and policy-makers.
Board gender quotas have been implemented in
several countries and there is evidence that gender
diversity results in stronger oversight (Larcker and
Tayan, 2016). For example, female directors are
more likely to sit on key monitoring committees,
and are associated with lower director compensa-
tion, enhanced CEO turnover–performance sensi-
tivity, improved performance for ﬁrms with agency
problems (Adams and Ferreira, 2009), improved
stock price informativeness (Gul, Srinidhi and Ng,
2011), better earnings quality (Gul, Srinidhi and
Tsui, 2011) and the restraint of CEO overconﬁ-
dence (Chen et al., 2016).
In contrast to gender diversity, there is a paucity
of such knowledge on racial and ethnic diversity.
This is despite the importance to both ﬁrms and
policy-makers. In their 2016 annual survey report,
Spencer Stuart reported that 55% of respondents
indicated that recruiting ethnic minority (hence-
forth in this paper minority refers speciﬁcally to
ethnic minority) directors was a priority. Further-
more, in response to low ethnic board diversity in
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the UK, the Parker review (Parker, 2017) recom-
mended that each FTSE 100 board should have at
least one minority director by 2021. In this study
we ﬁll what we consider to be an important gap in
the literature: an empirical examination of board
ethnic diversity and the key board role of monitor-
ing executive management.
From a theoretical perspective, the effect of eth-
nic diversity on monitoring could be positive, neu-
tral or negative. Boardmonitoringmay be stronger
if ethnically diverse boards have more information
andmake better monitoring decisions, or if minor-
ity directors are stronger individual monitors due
to higher independence (due to their ethnic differ-
ence) and higher director quality (due to discrimi-
nation). However, such differences may not hold in
practice. Minority directors are typically selected
after a very thorough vetting, and subsequently
may be similar in terms of perspectives to Cau-
casians. Additionally, being in a minority may cre-
ate pressure to conform and not behave differently.
Thus, monitoring outcomes could be no different
for ethnically diverse boards. Alternatively, differ-
ences could be such that they result in conﬂict and
less efficient monitoring decisions.
A small number of empirical studies have exam-
ined the impact of board ethnic diversity on overall
ﬁrm performance, the results of which are mixed
(Larcker and Tayan, 2016). Carter, Simkins and
Simpson (2003) ﬁnd a positive relation between
minority directors and Tobin’s Q, as do Miller
and Triana (2009) for proﬁtability, yet Carter et al.
(2010) ﬁnd no association with either measure.
Two other papers include ethnic diversity within
a broader measure of board diversity, which is
associated with positive ﬁrm performance out-
comes. Anderson et al. (2011) examine race, gen-
der, age, education and occupation together, whilst
Erhardt, Werbel and Shrader (2003) consider mi-
nority and gender diversity together. These stud-
ies tell us little about board monitoring outcomes,
since stronger monitoring could improve ﬁrm per-
formance by reducing agency costs (Hermalin and
Weisbach, 2003) or lower overall ﬁrm performance
due to weaker board advising and greater man-
agerial myopia (Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Faleye,
Hoitash and Hoitash, 2011).
Further, ﬁrm performance outcomes may also
reﬂect other (i.e. non-monitoring) effects of board
ethnic diversity, such as the advisory role of the
board (Adams, Hermalin andWeisbach, 2010) (i.e.
more diverse viewpoints leading to better board
decisions) or providing access to external resources
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) such as minority con-
sumers and employees. Minority directors may
provide advice about such groups, communicate
with them and/or signal legitimacy to them.Miller
and Triana (2009) show that ethnic diversity posi-
tively impacts ﬁrm performance via two mediating
variables (innovation and reputation), suggesting
an improvement in both these roles.
Monitoring strength may manifest itself in
terms of board task outcomes and ﬁrm perfor-
mance, the latter being positively moderated by
agency costs. Our empirical approach examines
each, ensuring that, as the ﬁrst study to examine
this issue, our conclusions are based on a wide
range of potential impacts. Given that ﬁrm perfor-
mance is noisy, determined by many factors and
at best bears a distal relation to board diversity,
we respond to observers’ encouragement to exam-
ine more direct organizational outcomes (Adams
et al., 2015; Ferreira, 2010, 2015; Hillman, 2015;
Nielsen and Huse, 2010; Zona and Zattoni, 2007).
Identifying causal impacts is likely confounded
to some degree by endogeneity problems, as-
sociated with unobservable omitted variables
and reverse causality (Abdallah, Goergen and
O’Sullivan, 2015; Bettis et al., 2014; Ferreira,
2010). The appointment of outside directors is en-
dogenous to ﬁrm performance (Adams, Herma-
lin and Weisbach, 2010; Hermalin and Weisbach,
1988), and minority director appointments could
be endogenously caused by ﬁrm characteristics
which could be invariant or variant with time, ob-
servable or unobservable. With reverse causality,
the presence of minority directors could be de-
termined by past or expected ﬁrm performance
and/or monitoring strength.1
In our setting there are no obvious quasi-natural
experiments or shocks to facilitate causal infer-
ence. We instead employ ﬁrm ﬁxed effects and in-
strumental variable analysis, each of which has
limitations (Bettis et al., 2014; Semadeni, Withers
1For example, underperforming ﬁrms, or ﬁrms with weak
governance, may appoint minority directors (perhaps due
to pressure to improve their governance). Alternatively, if
ﬁrms appoint minority directors as tokens, they may do
so only when they are performing (or expecting to per-
form) well and can thus afford to do so (Ferreira, 2010).
Alternatively, CEOs could be rewarded with higher com-
pensation for achieving diversity. Anecdotal evidence of
this is provided by Broome, Conley and Krawiec (2011a,
p. 798) and Barbaro (2004).
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and Trevis Certo, 2014).2 However, since our key
ﬁnding is consistent across all methods, we are
reasonably conﬁdent of its robustness. We also
address endogeneity by examining the theoretical
mechanism that predicts cause and effect (Bettis
et al., 2014). Since stronger monitoring should cre-
ate more value in ﬁrms with higher agency costs
(Adams and Ferreira, 2007, 2009; Faleye, Hoitash
andHoitash, 2011), we examine whether the diver-
sity performance relation is moderated by agency
costs.
We make several contributions to the literature.
First, within the board diversity literature, we
provide the ﬁrst evidence on board ethnic diversity
and monitoring. We thus answer recent calls to
consider aspects of board diversity beyond gender
(Adams et al., 2015; Hillman, 2015). Since the
literature shows gender diversity to be associated
with stronger monitoring (Adams and Ferreira,
2009), it is important to examine whether the
ﬁnding also holds for ethnic diversity. Second,
we add to a recent stream of research showing
that outside director characteristics matter for
the strength of monitoring, advisory beneﬁts
and ﬁrm performance.3 Third, we increase our
understanding of ethnic diversity within the
highest leadership ranks of corporations, an area
which is under-researched despite the importance
to ﬁrms and policy-makers (Guest, 2016, 2017;
Hill, Upadhyay and Beekun, 2014). More broadly,
we contribute to the literature on minority par-
ticipation in the US workforce, which, despite
being considered a key organizational issue of our
time (Richard, 2000), remains under-researched
(Richard, Murthi and Ismail, 2007).
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next sec-
tion we review the potential impacts of board eth-
nicity on board monitoring and present our hy-
potheses. In the third section, we report our results
2BothCarter, Simkins and Simpson (2003) andMiller and
Triana (2009) employ cross-sectional data, which does not
facilitate causal inference. Carter et al. (2010) control for
the possibility that past performance inﬂuences board di-
versity, but not future performance.
3Studies have also illustrated the importance of nation-
ality (Frijns, Dodd and Cimerova, 2016; Masulis, Wang
and Xie, 2012), ﬁnancial expertise (Guner, Malmendier
and Tate, 2008), political experience (Agrawal and Knoe-
ber, 2001; Goldman, Rocholl and So, 2009) and occupa-
tion [CEOs (Fahlenbrach, Low and Stulz, 2010), bankers
(Dittman, Maug and Scheider, 2010), academics (Fran-
cis, Hasan and Wu, 2015; White et al., 2014) and former
CEOs (Fahlenbrach, Minton and Pan, 2011)].
and analysis. In the ﬁnal section, we discuss our
ﬁndings, their limitations andmake suggestions for
future research.
Theoretical framework and hypothesis
development
In this section, we discuss the potential impacts of
ethnic diversity on board monitoring, stratifying
theories into those predicting a positive, neutral
or negative effect. These effects are summarized in
Table 1.
Positive effects of board ethnic diversity
on monitoring
The argument that ethnic diversity will positively
impact role oversight is motivated along several
lines. First, minority directors may possess differ-
ent sensitivities and behavioural traits from Cau-
casia directors, due to different socialization expe-
riences. They are more likely to have experienced
discrimination, and thus have a keener sensitiv-
ity towards unfairness. This could manifest itself
in stronger objection to agency problems which
beneﬁt management at the expense of other stake-
holders, such as excessive CEO pay,4 accounting
misreporting, CEOs not being replaced despite
underperformance, andwealth-destroyingmergers
and acquisitions. Second, the literature on inter-
group relations shows a tendency for group cate-
gorization based on ethnicity (Tajfel and Turner,
1986). Compared with Caucasians, minority direc-
tors may have less allegiance towards ‘out-group’
Caucasian CEOs. Consistent with this, Broome,
Conley and Krawiec (2011b) provide evidence that
minority directors have weaker social relations
with Caucasian executives. Additionally, minor-
ity directors are often recruited from outside the
executive ranks, and are thus more independent
of the ‘old boys club’ (Hillman, Cannella and
Harris, 2002; Zweigenhaft and Domhoff, 2008).
Third, ethnic minority directors may work rela-
tively hard to show that they deserve their position
rather than being appointed due to affirmative ac-
tion or an implicit quota. Fourth, to be appointed
directors despite discrimination, ethnic minorities
4Krawiec, Conley and Broome (2013) provide anecdotal
evidence of aminority director being the only director ob-
jecting to an executive pay package on such grounds.
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Table 1. Potential impacts of board ethnic diversity on board monitoring
Level Theory Result
Effect on
monitoring
Board Group diversity Better board decisions Positive
Director Out-group More independent Positive
Director Discrimination Higher director quality Positive
Board Selection bias (ethnics same as
Caucasians)
Board decisions no different Neutral
Director Selection bias (ethnics same as
Caucasians)
Director behaviour no different Neutral
Director Tokenism Director behaviour no different Neutral
Board Group diversity Conﬂict Negative
Director Implicit quota Lower director quality Negative
Director Ethnic-speciﬁc role Not focused on monitoring Negative
may need to have particularly high qualities and
thus be more capable.5
Board ethnicity may also contribute to more
general beneﬁts of diversity. Decision-making
groups that are made up of individuals with di-
verse human capital, attitudes, cognitive functions
and beliefs are more likely to have a wider breadth
of information available to them and to incur cog-
nitive conﬂict (Watson, Kumar and Michaelsen,
1993). They are thus more likely to consider a
wider range of solutions, have more challenging
discussions and generate more innovative ideas
and higher-quality solutions (Hillman, Cannella
and Harris, 2002). Ethnicity is an important de-
mographic variable which is associated with such
diverse characteristics (Robinson and Dechant,
1997), and thus ethnic diversity may reap such
beneﬁts (Cox, Lobel and McLeod, 1991). If these
differences hold at the director level, then board
ethnic diversity may lead to better board decision-
making and thus better monitoring decisions
(Milliken and Martins, 1996). Additionally, the
increase in potential solutions may enable outside
directors to more openly express their thoughts,
and be less likely to be inﬂuenced by management
and suffer from ‘groupthink’ (Coles, Daniel and
Naveen, 2015).
Neutral effects of board ethnic diversity
on monitoring
Selection issues may weaken the above monitor-
ing beneﬁts of ethnic diversity. Minority directors
5Consistent with this, Hillman, Cannella and Harris
(2002) ﬁnd that minority directors are more likely to hold
advanced degrees, although they are less likely to come
from a business background.
are a highly select group, whose perspective and
experience could be closer to those of Caucasian
directors than in the population at large. For mi-
nority directors with executive experience, this is
especially so. Research shows that female execu-
tives are not representative of the female popula-
tion in terms of values and risk proﬁles (Adams
and Funk, 2012; Adams and Ragunathan, 2015).
Even minority directors without executive experi-
ence may still be in the ‘old boys club’ if they come
from an elite background (i.e. Ivy League college),
which is necessary to enter the tightknit director
network. Minority directors are typically selected
after a thorough vetting to ensure they will ‘ﬁt in’
(Broome, Conley and Krawiec, 2011a).
Additionally, the theory of tokenism (Kanter,
1977) points towards a neutral effect on board out-
comes. Where an out-group member is in a nu-
merical minority, as minority outside directors on
boards almost always are, they could be subject to
heightened visibility. This could result in pressure
to not outperform Caucasian directors or to cen-
sor their opinions if conﬂicting, and thus a reluc-
tance to take a relatively tough stance in monitor-
ing situations.
Negative effects of board ethnic diversity
on monitoring
The diverse backgrounds of minority directors
may result in conﬂict or less trust with Caucasian
directors. Either may limit group communication
and cohesiveness, lowering board effectiveness and
the monitoring function (Ferreira, 2010). The ma-
jority group (Caucasians) may exclude minori-
ties from information-sharing activities, limiting
minority directors’ ability to be strong monitors.
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Such conﬂict could negate either the group moni-
toring beneﬁts or the ability of individual minority
directors to be stronger monitors on an individual
basis.
If minority directors are appointed predomi-
nantly for their minority status and the supply of
qualiﬁed minority candidates is insufficient, then
those selected may be of lower quality and un-
derperform their monitoring function (Ferreira,
2010). Carleton, Nelson andWeisbach (1998) pro-
vide evidence of one ﬁrm resisting institutional
shareholder pressure to appoint a minority direc-
tor on the grounds that the best qualiﬁed director
may not be a minority or female.
Finally, minority directors may play a speciﬁc
role related to their minority status and conse-
quently regard monitoring as secondary (Ferreira,
2010). For example, minority directors may pro-
vide counsel about, communicate with and provide
legitimacy to stakeholders such as minority con-
sumers, minority employees and the government
(since government suppliers must meet procure-
ment targets on diversity).6
Hypotheses
The preceding section makes clear that the rela-
tion between ethnic diversity and board monitor-
ing is an empirical question. Our ﬁrst hypothesis is
that:
H1: Ethnic board diversity strengthens board moni-
toring outcomes
We examine several different monitoring out-
comes. First, stronger monitoring should be as-
sociated with lower CEO compensation and a
higher fraction of CEO pay in equity incentives.
Second, stronger monitoring should be associated
with a stronger sensitivity of CEO turnover to ﬁrm
performance (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Herma-
lin and Weisbach, 1988; Masulis, Wang and Xie,
2012). Third, ensuring the integrity of ﬁnancial
statements is a critical monitoring function for
outside directors (Francis, Hasan and Wu, 2015;
Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2012) and thus stronger
monitoring should be associated with a lower like-
lihood of accountingmisstatements. Finally, merg-
ers and acquisitions (M&As) are an appropriate
6Many of these potential neutral and negative outcomes
reﬂect other underlying causes (e.g. prejudice, stereotyp-
ing, selection problems) rather than diversity per se.
event to examine for director monitoring, since
they often destroy value and are arguably moti-
vated by managerial rather than shareholder gain
(e.g. Masulis, Wang and Xie, 2007). Stronger mon-
itoring should therefore be associated with higher
M&A performance.
Stronger monitoring is expected to result in
higher ﬁrm performance in poorly governed ﬁrms
with high agency costs (Adams and Ferreira, 2007,
2009; Faleye, Hoitash and Hoitash, 2011). Thus, if
ethnic diversity is associated with stronger moni-
toring, the ethnic diversity–ﬁrm performance re-
lation should be positively moderated by gov-
ernance strength. Our second hypothesis is as
follows:
H2: The relation between ethnic board diversity and
ﬁrm performance is positively moderated by agency
costs
Our measures of ﬁrm performance are ﬁrm prof-
itability and value, proxied by Tobin’s Q. In addi-
tion, we examine the stock price reaction to the
announcement of minority outside director ap-
pointments to measure how the stock market eval-
uates their contribution to ﬁrm value (e.g. Fahlen-
brach, Low and Stulz, 2010; Masulis, Wang and
Xie, 2012; White et al., 2014).
Data and methodology
Sample
We employ a US setting due to the relatively high
level of board ethnic diversity, data availability and
the relatively strong monitoring role played by US
boards, which should facilitate the detection of a
stronger monitoring role played by ethnic minori-
ties if it exists. Board minority representation is
8.5% in theUSA (sample estimate), comparedwith
3.4% in Canada (Mcfarland, 2013), 1.8% in the
UK (Parker, 2017) and lower for mainland Europe
(Foroohar, 2002).
Our sample of ﬁrms and outside directors is
drawn from the Investor Responsibility Research
Center (IRRC) database, which reports race and
ethnicity for S&P 1500 ﬁrm directors as either
Caucasian, African American, Asian, Hispanic or
Native American. We identify errors in the IRRC’s
classiﬁcation of minority directors, and therefore
clean the data and manually check all directors
classiﬁed as a minority by the IRRC. The process
employed is described in Appendix A.
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We require that ethnic classiﬁcation is available
for all directors for a given ﬁrm year and that
the ﬁrm is available on the Compustat and Center
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) databases.
Our ﬁnal sample comprises 1,906 unique ﬁrms
and 11,916 ﬁrm year observations over 1996–
2011. In the sample, 6,690 ﬁrm years have at least
one minority outside director, whilst 2,648 have
more than one. Our sample contains 14,947 unique
outside directors, comprising 13,619 Caucasians
and 1,328 minorities (633 African Americans, 395
Asians and 300 Hispanics). Our sample is much
larger and covers a much longer time frame than
prior studies.7
Empirical modelling
Our analysis at the ﬁrm level involves two dichoto-
mous outcomes (CEO turnover and accounting
misstatements), for whichwe employ a logitmodel.
For other ﬁrm-level outcomes (CEO compensa-
tion, acquisition performance, ﬁrm performance
and director appointment returns) we use ordinary
least squares (OLS). Following the main analysis,
we report additional results that check the robust-
ness of our models to problems of omitted vari-
ables and endogeneity bias.
Dependent variables
A detailed description of all variables is provided
in Appendix B. Data on compensation is from Ex-
ecuComp. CEO compensation is the natural loga-
rithm of CEO total annual compensation in thou-
sands of 2011 US dollars. CEO incentive pay is the
annual value of restricted stock and option grants
scaled by total annual compensation.
Our ﬁrst measure of CEO turnover is from Exe-
cuComp, and is a dummy variable set equal to one
if the CEO leaves in the next ﬁscal year (excluding
cases described as ‘deceased’), zero otherwise. Un-
forced turnover (i.e. retirements and resignations
due to personal reasons) may account for a large
proportion of CEO turnover (Jenter and Kanaan,
2015) and do not reﬂect board monitoring. Forced
turnover is a dummy variable set equal to one if the
CEO is forced out of post in the next ﬁscal year,
zero otherwise. We employ the dataset of Peters
7In contrast, Carter, Simkins and Simpson (2003) exam-
ine 638 ﬁrms over one year, whilst Carter et al. (2010) ex-
amine 950 ﬁrm years (314 ﬁrms over 5 years).
and Wagner (2014) and Jenter and Kanaan (2015)
for 1996–2010.8
Data on ﬁnancial misstatements is from the Se-
curity and Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s) Ac-
counting and Auditing Enforcement Releases,
as compiled by the University of California-
Berkeley’s Center for Financial Reporting and
Management (CFRM).9 The CFRM data con-
tains CIK codes, ﬁrm names and misstatement ﬁs-
cal years, which we match with sample ﬁrm years.
Our dependent variable is accounting misstate-
ment, a dummy variable set equal to one for these
ﬁrm years, zero otherwise.
We identify sample ﬁrmM&As using the Securi-
ties Data Corporation (SDC) database. We require
that each deal is completed, that the value is dis-
closed and greater than $1m, and that the acquirer
controls less than 50% of target shares prior to and
100% after the deal. Financial (governance) data
must be available for the last ﬁnancial year (an-
nual meeting) prior to announcement. Our depen-
dent variable is M&A returns, measured using cu-
mulative abnormal returns (CAR) and the market
model over a 3-day window (−1, 1), where day 0 is
the announcement date.
We measure ﬁrm performance using proﬁtabil-
ity and Tobin’s Q. Data is from Compustat. Of the
97,154 outside director ﬁrm years, 7,186 are iden-
tiﬁed as appointment years. We collect appoint-
ment announcement dates from BoardEx (avail-
able from 2003), and require that daily share price
data is available on the CRSP database. This re-
sults in 4,273 sample appointment years, 2,940
(69%) of which wematchwith BoardEx announce-
ment dates,10 of which 390 are minority appoint-
ments. Our dependent variable is themarketmodel
CAR estimated over a 3-day event window (−1, 1).
Independent variables
Our key independent variable for the ﬁrm-level
analysis is the number of minority outside direc-
tors divided by total outside directors (fractionmi-
nority). We restrict our analysis to minority out-
side directors, since minority inside directors are
8We are grateful to Dirk Jenter, Fadi Kanaan, Florian Pe-
ters and Alexander Wagner for making their data avail-
able.
9This database is described in Dechow et al. (2011).
10Comparable with Fahlenbrach, Low and Stulz (2010),
who ﬁnd announcement dates for 63.5% of their sample.
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not expected to play a monitoring role and are rel-
atively low in number.
For the determination of CEO compensation,
membership of the compensation committee is
likely to be important. Fraction minority on com-
pensation committee is deﬁned as the proportion
of minority outside directors on the compensa-
tion committee. Similarly, given the importance of
the audit committee in monitoring ﬁrm ﬁnancial
statement integrity (Masulis,Wang andXie, 2012),
we examine whether the proportion of minority
outside directors on the audit committee (fraction
minority on audit committee) is related to mis-
statement likelihood. Data is from IRRC for both
variables.
For CEO turnover, our measure of performance
is the ﬁrm’s stock return for the ﬁscal year. To
assess whether minority directors impact the rela-
tion between turnover and performance, we inter-
act this stock return variable with the fraction mi-
nority variable. Stock return data is from CRSP.
For the director appointment returns analysis,
minority is a dummy variable set equal to one if
the director is either African American, Asian or
Hispanic, zero otherwise.
Moderating variable
As a proxy for ﬁrm governance strength, we use
the entrenchment index (E-index) of Bebchuk,
Cohen and Ferrell (2009). This is the sum of
six provisions (staggered boards, limits to share-
holder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden
parachutes, supermajority requirements for merg-
ers, charter amendments) found to be most rel-
evant for ﬁrm performance of the 24 considered
by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003). A higher
value indicates higher insulation from takeover
and hence weaker governance.We create this index
using the GMI database.
Control variables
We employ standard control variables. Firm-level
controls include the fraction of female directors,
board size, fraction of independent directors, ﬁrm
size, number of business segments, volatility, prof-
itability and Tobin’s Q. CEO controls include
tenure, age and whether the CEO is chairman.
Deal controls for the M&A returns model in-
clude relative size, whether the acquisition is di-
versifying, cash-ﬁnanced, stock-ﬁnanced, hostile,
cross-border, whether there is a competing bidder
and whether the target is publicly listed. Direc-
tor controls for the appointment returns model in-
clude director independence, gender, age, number
of other directorships held, foreign, retired and if
not retired, whether working as an executive or in
ﬁnance, consulting, academia, legal or non-proﬁt
sectors.11 We include year and industry dummies
(two-digit SIC) in all models. To reduce the inﬂu-
ence of outliers, all continuous variables are win-
sorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on board,
ﬁrm, M&As and director appointment character-
istics. There are 896 CEO turnover events, an un-
conditional turnover likelihood of 11%. Forced
CEO turnover is much less frequent, occurring in
1% of sample ﬁrm years. There are 136 sample ﬁrm
year ﬁnancial misstatements. The E-index is not
available in every sample year, and thus our mod-
erating tests employ a smaller subsample. The vari-
able ranges from zero to six, with an average of two.
Our M&A sample consists of 2,322 deals.
Results and analysis
Monitoring outcomes
Table 3 reports regression results for board mon-
itoring outcomes. Model 1 reports the determi-
nants of CEO total compensation. The coefficient
for fraction minority is a statistically signiﬁcant
0.315. This implies that increasing the proportion
of minority directors by 0.1 [representing one stan-
dard deviation in fraction minority or the addition
of almost one (0.85) minority director] increases
compensation by 3.15% and is thus of small eco-
nomic magnitude. Model 2 reports that the coeffi-
cient for fraction minority on compensation com-
mittee is 0.125, implying that a committeemade up
fully of minorities would be associated with 12.5%
higher CEO compensation. However, this coeffi-
cient is statistically insigniﬁcant.
Model 3 reports the determinants of CEO incen-
tive pay, for which there is a positive but small and
11Additional analysis shows that minority outside direc-
tors aremore likely thanCaucasian outside directors to be
independent (93–88%), female (24–13%) and foreign (6–
3%), but less likely to be retired (16–27%) or current ex-
ecutives (37–42%). Additionally, minority outside direc-
tors are on average younger (58–62 years), of lower tenure
(6.3–8.6 years), but hold a greater number of directorships
(1.38–1.06).
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics
Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max
Panel A: Board characteristics
Fraction minority 11,916 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.00 1.00
Fraction minority on
compensation committee
11,337 0.08 0.00 0.13 0.00 1.00
Fraction minority on audit
committee
11,337 0.09 0.00 0.13 0.00 1.00
Fraction female 11,916 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.00 0.60
Board size 11,916 9.78 10.00 2.61 4.00 30.00
Fraction independent 11,916 0.73 0.77 0.15 0.00 1.00
CEO tenure 7,827 8.57 7.00 7.31 0.00 59.00
CEO-chairman 8,278 0.72 1.00 0.45 0.00 1.00
CEO age 8,031 56.84 57.00 7.00 32.00 94.00
CEO compensation* 8,256 8.32 8.34 1.01 5.59 10.62
CEO incentive pay 8,220 0.59 0.66 0.27 0.00 0.97
CEO turnover 8,278 0.11 0.00 0.31 0.00 1.00
CEO forced turnover 8,237 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.00 1.00
Panel B: Firm characteristics
Firm size 11,912 7.92 7.84 1.48 4.29 11.21
Proﬁtability 11,911 0.05 0.05 0.07 −0.34 0.24
Tobin’s Q 11,902 1.87 1.47 1.168 0.81 8.260
# Business segments 11,916 1.76 1.00 1.19 1.00 10.00
Volatility 11,830 10.33 9.07 5.53 3.02 34.89
E-index 4,980 3.07 3.00 1.50 0.00 6.00
Stock performance 11,796 0.15 0.11 0.44 −0.74 2.06
Accounting misstatement 11,916 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.00 1.00
Fraction HQ minority 11,831 0.34 0.33 0.20 0.00 0.97
Panel C: Merger and acquisition characteristics
M&A returns 2,322 0.00 0.00 0.05 −0.20 0.30
Diversifying 2,322 0.45 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00
Public target 2,322 0.24 0.00 0.43 0.00 1.00
All-cash 2,322 0.40 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00
All-stock 2,322 0.10 0.00 0.30 0.00 1.00
Hostile 2,322 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.00
Competing 2,322 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.00 1.00
Cross-border 2,322 0.22 0.00 0.41 0.00 1.00
Relative size 2,322 0.11 0.03 0.24 0.00 3.83
Panel D: Director appointment characteristics
Appointment returns 2,397 0.00 0.00 0.03 −0.10 0.13
Minority 2,397 0.14 0.00 0.35 0.00 1.00
Independent 2,397 0.95 1.00 0.21 0.00 1.00
Female 2,397 0.18 0.00 0.38 0.00 1.00
Age 2,397 57.06 58.00 7.25 29.00 80.00
# Other directorships 2,397 0.91 1.00 1.06 0.00 7.00
Foreign 2,397 0.05 0.00 0.22 0.00 1.00
Retired 2,397 0.17 0.00 0.38 0.00 1.00
Executive 2,397 0.35 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00
Finance 2,397 0.16 0.00 0.37 0.00 1.00
Consulting 2,397 0.09 0.00 0.28 0.00 1.00
Academic 2,397 0.07 0.00 0.26 0.00 1.00
Legal 2,397 0.02 0.00 0.15 0.00 1.00
Non-proﬁt 2,397 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.00 1.00
Other 2,397 0.11 0.00 0.32 0.00 1.00
The data in Panels A and B is panel data for an unbalanced sample of 1,906 ﬁrms for 1996–2011. Not all ﬁrms have data for all years.
The data in Panel C is for 2,322 acquisitions completed by this sample of ﬁrms for 1996–2011. The data in Panel D is for 2,397 director
appointments associated with this sample of ﬁrms for 2003–2011.
* CEO compensation in USD: 6,643.0 (mean), 4,206.5 (median), 7,319.8 (std. dev), 266.82 (min) and 40,798.2 (max).
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insigniﬁcant associationwith the proportion ofmi-
nority outside directors. The coefficient of 0.047
implies that increasing the proportion of minority
directors by 0.1 increases the fraction of incentive
pay by just 0.005. A similar small and weak associ-
ation holds for the proportion of minority outside
directors on the compensation committee (model
4). In this case the statistically insigniﬁcant coeffi-
cient of 0.014 implies that increasing the propor-
tion by one-third increases the fraction of CEO in-
centive pay by an economically insigniﬁcant 0.005.
We thus ﬁnd no evidence that ethnic minority di-
rectors strengthen board monitoring of executive
compensation.
Model 5 reports logit regression results on
the likelihood of accounting misstatements. The
coefficient on fraction minority is a negative but
statistically insigniﬁcant −0.456, implying that
an increase of 0.1 in fraction minority decreases
the likelihood of a misstatement by 3.7%. Model
6 reports similar results for the effect of fraction
minority on audit committee, for which the
coefficient is a statistically insigniﬁcant −0.505.
We thus ﬁnd no evidence that board ethnic
diversity signiﬁcantly reduces the likelihood of
accounting irregularities. Regarding controls, mis-
statement likelihood is negatively correlated with
the proportion of independent directors and prof-
itability, whilst it is positively correlated with size,
consistent with Masulis, Wang and Xie (2012).
Model 7 reports logit regression results for CEO
turnover. Consistent with prior ﬁndings (Adams
and Ferreira, 2009; Masulis, Wang and Xie, 2012),
turnover is decreasing in ﬁrm stock performance,
indicating that underperforming CEOs are more
likely to be replaced. The coefficient of −0.39 is
statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The co-
efficient on the interaction between fraction mi-
nority and stock performance is 0.95 and sta-
tistically insigniﬁcant, suggesting that minority
outsiders weaken the negative relation between
ﬁrm performance and CEO turnover but not sig-
niﬁcantly so. Model 8 reports results using the
forced turnover cases. The negative relation be-
tween ﬁrm performance and forced turnover is
larger, as expected, with a coefficient of −1.64,
whilst the coefficient on the interaction variable
is again insigniﬁcantly positive with a value of
2.81. Our results indicate that board ethnic di-
versity is not associated with stronger monitoring
in terms of higher CEO replacement–performance
sensitivity.
Model 9 reports the determinants of M&A
returns. The coefficient for fraction minority is
−0.002, which is statistically and economically in-
signiﬁcant, implying that increasing fraction mi-
nority by 0.1 decreases M&A returns by an eco-
nomically small 0.02%. We conclude that board
ethnic diversity is not associated with acquisition
quality. With regard to other controls, returns are
higher when the method of payment is all cash
and lower when the target is public, the method
of payment is all stock, the acquisition is diversify-
ing and as acquisition relative size increases, con-
sistent with prior studies (e.g. Fahlenbrach, Low
and Stulz, 2010).
In summary, our results suggest that the pres-
ence of minority directors is not associated with
stronger board monitoring across any one of our
monitoring outcomes, and we therefore reject H1.
Firm performance
Table 4 reports OLS results for the determinants of
proﬁtability and Tobin’s Q.Model 1 shows that the
association between fraction minority and prof-
itability is insigniﬁcant, both economically and
statistically. The coefficient of 0.002 indicates that
increasing fraction minority by 0.1 increases prof-
itability by just 0.0002. Model 3 reports a similar
pattern for Tobin’s Q, the statistically insigniﬁcant
coefficient of 0.158 implying that increasing frac-
tion minority by 0.1 would increase Tobin’s Q by
just 0.0158. Our ﬁndings are consistent with those
of Carter et al. (2010), but inconsistent with those
of Carter, Simkins and Simpson (2003) and Miller
and Triana (2009), who document a signiﬁcantly
positive relation.
The ﬁndings for controls are broadly consistent
with previous studies. The coefficient for the pro-
portion of female directors is insigniﬁcantly neg-
ative (positive) in the proﬁtability (Tobin’s Q) re-
gression, whilst ﬁrms with higher performance are
larger, have fewer business segments and a lower
proportion of independent directors.
Models 2 and 4 test whether the relation be-
tween board ethnic diversity and ﬁrm performance
is moderated by governance strength, as proxied
by the E-index. We ﬁnd no evidence of this. Whilst
the coefficient on the E-index is signiﬁcantly nega-
tive, consistent with Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell
(2009), the coefficient on the interaction term
(fraction minority interacted with the E-index) in
both regressions is economically and statistically
C© 2019 The Author. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 4. Regressions of ﬁrm performance on board ethnic diversity
Proﬁtability Proﬁtability Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Fraction minority 0.002 0.007 0.158 0.108
(0.012) (0.025) (0.186) (0.481)
Fraction female −0.014 0.007 0.116 0.181
(0.015) (0.018) (0.260) (0.303)
Board size 0.000 0.000 −0.028*** −0.034***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.012)
Fraction independent −0.021*** −0.023** −0.594*** −0.429**
(0.008) (0.010) (0.173) (0.212)
Firm size 0.003** 0.004** 0.037* 0.030
(0.001) (0.002) (0.022) (0.024)
# Business segments −0.003*** −0.004*** −0.105*** −0.120***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.016) (0.018)
E-Index −0.002* −0.089***
(0.001) (0.026)
E-Index * Fraction minority 0.001 0.023
(0.008) (0.128)
N 9,638 4,033 9,636 4,032
Adjusted R2 0.1135 0.1453 0.2374 0.2701
The models are estimated using OLS. All models include industry dummies (two-digit SIC) and year dummies based on ﬁnancial year
ends. Firm variables aremeasured at the prior ﬁnancial year end, whilst board variables aremeasured at the annual shareholdersmeeting
that takes place within the current ﬁnancial year. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at
the ﬁrm level.
*, **, *** Signiﬁcance at the 90%, 95%, 99% level of conﬁdence, respectively.
insigniﬁcant. We conclude that board ethnic di-
versity does not improve performance in ﬁrms
with weak governance. This is inconsistent with
board ethnic diversity providing stronger monitor-
ing, and we thus reject H2.
Director appointment returns
Table 5 reports OLS analysis on the stock price re-
action to the announcement of outside director ap-
pointments. Model 1 shows that the coefficient for
minority status is 0.001, which is statistically in-
signiﬁcant and of small economic magnitude, im-
plying that appointing a minority outside director
increases appointment returns by 0.1% compared
with a Caucasian outside director. Thus, appoint-
ment returns do not differ materially between mi-
nority and Caucasian directors.
Model 2 includes the E-index and its interaction
with minority status, to test for a moderation effect
of corporate governance strength. The coefficient
for the interaction term is −0.001, thus opposite
in sign to that expected under H2, as well as eco-
nomically and statistically insigniﬁcant. Thus there
is no evidence that the stock market perceives mi-
nority director appointments to create more value
at weakly governed ﬁrms.
Robustness tests
In this section we describe additional tests con-
ducted to ensure the robustness of our key conclu-
sion that there is no evidence of board ethnic diver-
sity improving either monitoring outcomes or ﬁrm
performance for ﬁrms with higher agency costs.
These results are tabulated in the Supplementary
Appendix.
Omitted time-variant variables. We include addi-
tional controls for potential differences between
boards with minority outside directors and those
without, including outside director board aver-
ages for tenure, age, number of other director-
ships, number of foreign directors, number of re-
tired directors and number of executive directors
(in other ﬁrms). The results (Supplementary Ap-
pendix Tables A1 and A2) show that the coeffi-
cient for fraction minority is economically smaller
and statistically insigniﬁcant in the CEO compen-
sation regression, and therefore not robust to these
additional controls. The other results are consis-
tent with Tables 3 and 4, and our conclusions
unchanged.12
12Previous studies have documented a negative impact
of foreign directors on performance and monitoring
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Table 5. Regressions of director appointment returns on minority status
Appointment returns Appointment returns
Dependent variable (1) (2)
Minority 0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.006)
Independent 0.002 0.000
(0.004) (0.007)
Female 0.002 −0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Age 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
# Other directorships −0.001* −0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
Foreign 0.007* 0.002
(0.003) (0.004)
Retired 0.000 0.000
(0.003) (0.004)
Executive −0.001 −0.002
(0.003) (0.003)
Finance 0.003 0.004
(0.003) (0.004)
Consulting −0.002 −0.001
(0.004) (0.004)
Academic −0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.005)
Legal −0.006* −0.005
(0.004) (0.005)
Non-proﬁt −0.014** −0.010
(0.007) (0.010)
Board size 0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.001)
Fraction independent −0.007 0.005
(0.008) (0.012)
Firm size 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
# Business segments 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Proﬁtability −0.013 −0.032
(0.018) (0.027)
Tobin’s Q 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.002)
E-Index 0.000
(0.001)
E-Index * Minority −0.001
(0.002)
N 2,397 1,176
Adjusted R2 0.0503 0.0808
The models are estimated using OLS. Both models include industry dummies (two-digit SIC) and year dummies based on announce-
ment year. Individual director variables are measured at the next annual meeting date subsequent to the appointment. Board variables
are measured at the annual meeting date prior to the appointment. Firm variables are measured at the ﬁnancial year end prior to the
appointment. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the ﬁrm level.
*, **, *** Signiﬁcance at the 90%, 95%, 99% level of conﬁdence, respectively.
outcomes (Frijns, Dodd and Cimerova, 2016; Masulis,
Wang and Xie, 2012). However, board ethnic diversity
and national diversity are empirically distinct: the corre-
lation between the fraction of ethnic minority directors
(being an ethnic minority director) and the fraction of
foreign directors (being a foreign director) is just 0.065
(0.089). One explanation for the difference in our ﬁndings
from the above studies is that national cultural differences
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Omitted time-invariant ﬁrm effects. We employ
ﬁrm ﬁxed effects to control for unobservable time-
invariant ﬁrm effects (Supplementary Appendix
Tables A3 and A4). It is important to note that
fractionminority exhibits lowwithin-ﬁrm variance
and thus introducing ﬁrm ﬁxed effects could bias
our results in favour of a ﬁnding of no signiﬁcance
on fraction minority. The coefficient on fraction
minority loses signiﬁcance in the CEO compensa-
tion regression, suggesting the signiﬁcant correla-
tion reported in Table 3 could be due to ﬁrm ﬁxed
effects (or low power of the test). For the CEO in-
centive pay regression, the coefficient for fraction
minority is negative and statistically signiﬁcant at
the 10% level. However, the coefficient for fraction
minority on compensation committee is positive
and insigniﬁcant, which is inconsistent with mi-
nority directors causing lower CEO incentive pay.
Other results are unchanged.
Another way to address unobservable time-
invariant ﬁrm effects is difference-in-difference
analysis (Chen et al., 2016; Francis, Hasan and
Wu, 2015). We include a dummy variable set equal
to one for ﬁrms that have a minority outside di-
rector at some point over the sample period (ﬁrms
with a minority), zero otherwise. We include an-
other dummy variable set equal to one for ﬁrm
year observations in which there is a minority out-
side director (post-minority), zero otherwise. The
coefficient on post-minority measures the effect
of a minority outside director appointment after
controlling for the time-invariant characteristics of
ﬁrms that make such appointments (ﬁrms with a
minority). We create analogous variables for the
compensation and audit committee. Supplemen-
tary Appendix Tables A5 and A6 show, using this
approach, that the appointment of a minority out-
side director does not signiﬁcantly impact any of
our outcome variables.
Reverse causality. We control for reverse causal-
ity using instrumental variable analysis. Studies
show board composition to be impacted by lo-
cal availability of directors (Knyazeva, Knyazeva
and Masulis, 2013). We therefore instrument
the fraction minority variable with the propor-
tion of ethnic minorities in the ﬁrm’s headquar-
ter county population (fraction HQ minority)
(Anderson et al., 2011). Firm headquarter data is
are larger than within-country ethnic cultural differences
(Minkov and Hofstede, 2012).
from Compustat and county demographics from
USCensus annual intercensal estimates.13 We con-
sider it theoretically unlikely that board monitor-
ing outcomes or ﬁrm performance would be de-
termined by this instrument, and thus it should
meet the exclusion condition. We are also conﬁ-
dent that it meets the relevance condition, since
it loads signiﬁcantly positively on fraction minor-
ity and the Kleibergen–Paap Wald F-statistic is
sufficiently larger than the value of 10 proposed
by Stock, Yogo and Wright (2002). The instru-
ment does not, however, have predictive strength
for fraction minority on compensation committee
or fraction minority on audit committee, and thus
we do not instrument these variables. For the mod-
els (CEO turnover and ﬁrm performance) which
interact fraction minority with moderator vari-
ables, we instrument these interaction terms us-
ing the interaction of fraction HQ minority and
themoderator variable as an additional instrument
(Knyazeva, Knyazeva and Masulis, 2013). We use
a probit maximum likelihood model for the ac-
counting misstatement and CEO turnover regres-
sions. First-stage results are reported in Supple-
mentary Appendix Table A7, second-stage results
in Supplementary Appendix Tables A8 and A9.
For the OLS (probit) regressions, the Hausman
(Wald) test informs us whether the variable frac-
tion minority is exogenous to the outcome mea-
sure (i.e. whether there is a systematic difference
between the OLS and 2SLS estimates) and thus
whether reverse causality is a concern. For the
CEO compensation model, the Hausman test is
5.12 with a p-value of 0.02 whilst the coefficient for
fraction minority is signiﬁcantly positive and thus
robust to controlling for reverse causality. How-
ever, as shown above, this ﬁnding is not robust to
including other controls or ﬁrm ﬁxed effects. In
the other 2SLS regressions theHausman andWald
tests are statistically insigniﬁcant, and we therefore
do not reject the null hypothesis that fraction mi-
nority is exogenous to these outcomes. Given that,
in ﬁnite samples, the 2SLS results have low statis-
tical power and are biased and inconsistent, our
OLS results are more accurate in these cases (see
e.g. Schwartz-Ziv, 2017).
13The census data provides a breakdown of county popu-
lation according to race (White, Black, American Indian
or Alaska Native, Asian or Paciﬁc Islander) and ethnicity
(Hispanic or Latino).
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Dynamic endogeneity. Reverse causality may,
however, be dynamic. We control for the possi-
bility that ethnic diversity is determined by past
monitoring strength or ﬁrm performance by em-
ploying the Arellano–Bond (1991) one-step regres-
sion, which includes the lagged dependent vari-
able and is estimated with instruments of the
two-period (and earlier) lagged dependent variable
along with one-period lagged values of other con-
trol variables. As with ﬁrm ﬁxed effects, this test
will typically have low statistical power compared
with OLS. Supplementary Appendix Tables A10
and A11 show that the only difference from the
main results is that fraction minority on compen-
sation committee signiﬁcantly positively impacts
CEO compensation level and incentive pay, which
is an ambiguous ﬁnding in terms of monitoring
strength, and that fraction minority has a signiﬁ-
cantly negative impact on Tobin’s Q.
Sample selection. In constructing our sample, we
were unable to identify the ethnicity of all board
directors for a substantial proportion of ﬁrm year
observations [11,699 of 23,911 (49%)], and sub-
sequently excluded these observations, raising the
possibility that our results are unrepresentative.
Our coverage increases signiﬁcantly over time,
from 14% in 1996 to 95% in 2011. To check the gen-
eralizability of our results, we restrict the analysis
to years 2007–2011, for which the coverage is 71%.
This period is also advantageous because it in-
cludes the 2007–2009 ﬁnancial crisis, during which
time boards took on additional importance (e.g.
Francis, Hasan and Wu, 2012) and strong moni-
toring directors created value (Francis, Hasan and
Wu, 2015). If minority directors are stronger mon-
itors, then the effect should be more visible during
this period. The results (Supplementary Appendix
Tables A12 and A13) are, however, broadly consis-
tent with those for the main sample.
Alternatively, the impact of ethnic board diver-
sity on monitoring may be expected to be stronger
where the CEO is Caucasian rather than a minor-
ity. Of the 8,278 observations for which we identify
the CEO on ExecuComp, we identify the ethnic-
ity for 8,123 observations. Of these, 372 ﬁrm year
observations (4.6%) are ethnic minority CEOs. We
repeat our analysis (Tables 3–5) for the 7,751 ob-
servations of Caucasian CEOs. The results (Sup-
plementaryAppendix TablesA14–A16) are similar
to those for the overall sample and our conclusions
are unchanged.
Measurement of independent variable. It is possi-
ble that our results are sensitive to howwemeasure
minority director presence. At low representation,
minorities may suffer from token behaviour and be
marginalized (Kanter, 1977), not having an impact
until their number is sufficiently large.We therefore
alternatively employ a dummy variable that equals
one if there are at least two minority directors on
the board, zero otherwise. The analysis using this
approach (Supplementary Appendix Tables A17
and A18) shows our key ﬁndings to be unchanged.
Thus, the neutral effect does not appear to be due
to minorities representing a small proportion of
outside directors, since if so, we would expect to
ﬁnd stronger effects for these tests – especially
those for the compensation and audit committees,
which are smaller in size than the board.
Alternatively, board ethnic diversity may be
measured by the number of different ethnic mi-
nority groups present. We therefore alternatively
employ a variable that equals zero if no minori-
ties are present, one, two or three if one, two or
threeminority groups are represented, respectively.
The analysis using this approach (Supplementary
Appendix Tables A19 and A20) does not change
our ﬁndings.
Finally, we split minority directors into African
American, Asian and Hispanic. Previous studies
show that African American directors are more
likely to come from a working/middle-class back-
ground than Caucasian, Asian and Hispanic di-
rectors (Zweigenhaft and Domhoff, 2008), whilst
their history of slavery, segregation and civil rights
may render themmore of an out-group (and hence
more independent) than Asians andHispanics. We
re-estimate our analysis, replacing fraction minor-
ity with the proportion of African American (frac-
tion African American), Asian (fraction Asian)
andHispanic (fractionHispanic) outside directors.
The results (Supplementary Appendix Tables A21
and A22), however, show no consistent and sig-
niﬁcant effect associated with any speciﬁc ethnic
group.
Direct measures of monitoring. Our analysis has
focused on board monitoring outcomes, but it is
also possible that ethnic minority directors are as-
sociated with direct measures of monitoring, such
as the number of board meetings and attendance
at board meetings. We obtain data on the num-
ber of board meetings in a ﬁscal year from Execu-
Comp. Board attendance data is from the IRRC,
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which reports whether each outside directormisses
at least 25% of board meetings, which we aver-
age across all outside directors for each ﬁrm year.
We regress these measures on fraction minority
and other control variables. The results (Supple-
mentary Appendix Table A23) show no signiﬁcant
relation.
Appointment returns. Finally, we test the ro-
bustness of our appointment announcement
return ﬁndings in two ways. First, 753 of the
2,940 appointment dates include multiple director
appointments. We rerun our analysis on the 2,187
appointment dates which contain a single ap-
pointment announcement. The results (reported
in columns 1 and 2 of Supplementary Appendix
Table A24) are consistent with those in Table 5,
showing no signiﬁcant effect of minority status
on appointment returns. Second, we examine the
share price return at the appointment of the ﬁrst
ethnic minority director. The results (reported in
columns 3 and 4 of Supplementary Appendix Ta-
ble A24) show that the coefficient on minority re-
mains economically and statistically insigniﬁcant.
Conclusion
The effect of board ethnic diversity on ﬁrm per-
formance has been examined by a number of
studies. The important distinctive feature of our
study is our focus on whether ethnic diversity im-
pacts the monitoring role of the board, on which
we provide the ﬁrst empirical evidence. Regula-
tors, investors and diversity advocates have ar-
gued that ethnic diversity may strengthen board
monitoring. Our theoretical framework suggested
that whilst monitoring could be strengthened, it
could also be unaffected or weakened by ethnic
diversity.
Our ﬁrst hypothesis, that ethnic diversity
strengthens board monitoring outcomes, is re-
jected. We examine a range of board monitoring
outcomes including CEO compensation, account-
ing restatements, CEO turnover–performance
sensitivity and M&A performance. In the case
of compensation and accounting outcomes, we
consider ethnic diversity on the compensation
and audit committees, respectively. However,
we fail to ﬁnd any evidence that diversity is
associated with stronger monitoring outcomes.
If minority directors were stronger monitors, we
would expect them to improve ﬁrm performance
for ﬁrms with weak corporate governance or
agency costs. However, our second hypothesis,
that the relation between ethnic diversity and
ﬁrm performance is moderated by the strength of
corporate governance, is rejected.
We are reasonably conﬁdent that lack of sta-
tistical power is not the explanation for our lack
of ﬁndings. We employ the largest sample to date
and widely employed model speciﬁcations, reduc-
ing concerns about low statistical power due to
sample size (and low degrees of freedom) or model
misspeciﬁcation. We also pay careful attention to
endogeneity issues, employing ﬁxed effect, instru-
mental variable andArellano–Bond (1991) estima-
tors. Whilst these models typically have low power,
the results are consistent with our main results and
thus reinforce our ﬁnding of no impact. Our pri-
mary contribution to the board diversity literature
is that we fail to ﬁnd evidence that ethnic diversity
is associated with board monitoring.
An important limitation of our work is that we
do not disentangle the alternative explanations for
the lack of impact. For example, it may be caused
by board selection procedures that only select
minority directors who are very similar in outlook
to Caucasian directors. Instead, however, it could
be due to positive effects cancelling out negative
ones. For example, minority directors may be
more independent or of higher quality, but the
positive effect on monitoring is cancelled out by
these directors being given a board role related to
their ethnicity and thus taking their focus away
from monitoring. Our analysis does not reveal
which forces are at work, each of which has dif-
ferent implications, and thus our interpretation is
limited. However, as the ﬁrst study to examine this
topic (and hence the need to rigorously examine a
range of monitoring outcomes), this limitation is
perhaps unavoidable and shared with similar stud-
ies on board gender diversity (e.g. Sila, Gonzalez
and Hegendorff, 2016). We hope that future
research will uncover which channels are at work
by examining the theorized positive and negative
effects of ethnic diversity. Additionally, future
research should examine the behaviour and role
of minority directors, such as board engagement,
committeemembership and leadership. Any differ-
ence fromCaucasian directors may reﬂect strength
of individual monitoring, but also discrimination
or experience. Distinguishing amongst these
factors will provide us with a better understanding
of the monitoring role of minority directors.
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Our second contribution to the board diversity
literature is the ﬁnding that ethnic diversity is not
associated with ﬁrm performance. Whilst our em-
pirical setting is the USA, our results may general-
ize to (and have relevance for) similar institutional
settings, such as the UK. They are also relevant to
the policy debate on board quotas. Our ﬁndings
do not support the ‘business’ or ‘commercial’
case for increasing board ethnic diversity, which
posits that for the average ﬁrm, performance will
improve. Thus, our ﬁndings do not support one of
the key arguments used to support the introduc-
tion of a board ethnic diversity quota, such as that
recommended by the Parker review (Parker, 2017)
in the UK. If there are ﬁnancial beneﬁts, these are
not signiﬁcant enough to show up in overall ﬁrm
performance or value. Consequently, proponents
of increased board ethnic diversity would more
credibly make the case on non-ﬁnancial grounds,
such as fairness, equal opportunity and the sig-
nalling of commitment to an inclusive corporate
culture.
Appendix A: Identiﬁcation of minority
directors
We correct two types of inaccuracy in the unique
codes assigned by IRRC to each director. Firstly,
of the 34,938 unique IRRC codes we identify 869
directors who havemore than one unique code and
1,209 unique codes for which there is more than
one director. We identify individual directors us-
ing director name, ﬁrmCUSIP and director date of
birth. This results in 32,612 unique directors over
1996–2011, of whom1,680 are identiﬁed asminori-
ties, 18,215 as Caucasian and 12,717 of unknown
race. Secondly, there are inaccuracies with the
IRRC identiﬁcation of race. For example, 343 of
the 1,680 directors have an inconsistent ethnic clas-
siﬁcation over time. We therefore manually check
the ethnicity of all 1,680 directors. First, we employ
the following lists of minority board directors:
African Americans
 Zweigenhaft and Domhoff (2011)
 Executive Leadership Council (2004, 2008)
 http://www.blackenterprise.com/mag/power-in-
the-boardroom/
 http://www.blackenterprise.com/be-lists/the-
100-most-powerful-executives-in-corporate-
america/4/
 http://www.blackentrepreneurproﬁle.com/
fortune-500-ceos/
 http://www.thefreelibrary.com/America’s+
most+powerful+Black+executives%3A+
B.E.+selects+40+all-stars . . . -a013506897
 http://savoynetwork.com/category/the-list/
Asians
 Zweigenhaft and Domhoff (2011)
 Committee of 100 (2004, 2007)
 Leadership Education for Asian Paciﬁcs (2011)
 http://www.china4us.com/SinoCEO.htm
 http://www.88yp.com/Executives.htm
Hispanics
 Zweigenhaft and Domhoff (2011)
 Hispanic Business, Inc. (2002, 2004, 2005)
 Hispanic Association on Corporate Responsibil-
ity (2007)
 http://www.hispanicbusiness.com/branded/
2013/elite/boardroom_elite_bios.asp
 http://www.hispanicbusiness.com/2009/1/28/
2009_boardroom_elite_complete_list.htm
We conﬁrm the ethnicity of 684 directors using
these lists, 371 using online biographies, 178 using
online photos and 451 using names (clearHispanic
or Asian name consistent with IRRC classiﬁcation
of either minority). 62 of the 1,075 are concluded
to be Caucasian using online biographies and on-
line photos. For the 13 remaining directors we are
unable to verify their ethnicity and therefore ac-
cept the IRRC classiﬁcation. This process results in
19,933 directors of conﬁrmed ethnic background,
consisting of 18,235 Caucasian and 1,698 minor-
ity directors, the latter consisting of 682 African
American, 616 Asian, 398 Hispanic and 2 Native
American directors. We backﬁll the ethnic classiﬁ-
cation of directors for earlier IRRCyears for which
ethnicity is not reported. Out of a total 234,858
person-ﬁrm year observations, ethnicity is estab-
lished for 194,800.
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Appendix B: Variable deﬁnitions
Variable Deﬁnition
(A) Board characteristics
CEO compensation Natural logarithm of CEO total annual executive compensation (item TDC1) in thousands of 2011 US
dollars.
CEO incentive pay Annual value of restricted stock (item STOCK AWARDS FV) and option grants (item
OPTION AWARDS FV) scaled by total annual compensation (item TDC1).a
CEO turnover Dummy variable: 1 if CEO leaves post in the next ﬁscal year, 0 otherwise. Turnover cases described by
ExecuComp as ‘deceased’ are excluded.
CEO forced turnover Dummy variable: 1 if CEO is forced out of post in the next ﬁscal year, 0 otherwise. We employ the
dataset of Peters and Wagner (2014) and Jenter and Kanaan (2015), for which forced turnovers are
deﬁned as follows: (1) press reports state the CEO was ﬁred, forced out, or retires or resigns due to
policy differences or pressure; (2) CEO is less than 60 years old and the press do not report the
reason to be death, health or acceptance of another position, or press reports the CEO is retiring but
the company does not announce this at least six months in advance.
Fraction minority Ethnic minority outside directors divided by total outside directors.
Fraction minority on
compensation committee
Ethnic minority outside directors on compensation committee divided by number of directors on
compensation committee.
Fraction minority on audit
committee
Ethnic minority outside directors on audit committee divided by number of directors on audit
committee.
Fraction female Proportion of female directors to board size.
Board size Number of directors on board.
Fraction independent Proportion of independent directors to board size.
CEO tenure Number of years that the CEO has held the CEO position for.
CEO-chairman Dummy variable: 1 if the CEO is also the chairman, 0 otherwise.
CEO age Age of the CEO.
(B) Firm characteristics
Accounting misstatement Dummy variable: 1 for ﬁrm years in which there is an accounting misstatement, 0 otherwise.
Proﬁtability Net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations (item 18) scaled by total assets
(item 6).
Tobin’s Q Market value of equity minus book value of equity plus total assets scaled by total assets [(item 25 *
item 24 – item 60 + item 6) / item 6].
Firm size Log of sales (item 12), in millions of 2011 US dollars.
# Business segments Number of business segments.
Volatility Standard deviation of monthly stock returns for the ﬁscal year.
Stock performance Stock return for the ﬁscal year.
E-index The entrenchment index is the sum of six provisions (staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw
amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, supermajority requirements for mergers, charter
amendments), with a higher value indicating weaker governance.
Fraction HQ minority Proportion of non-white and Hispanic inhabitants of the county in which the ﬁrm is headquartered.
(C) Merger and acquisition characteristics
M&A returns Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) measured over the 3-day window (−1, 1) around announcement,
using a market model approach.
Diversifying Dummy variable: 1 if the primary two-digit SIC codes of the acquirer and the target are different, 0
otherwise.
Public target Dummy variable: 1 if target ﬁrm is publicly held, 0 otherwise.
All-cash Dummy variable: 1 if deal is purely cash ﬁnanced, 0 otherwise.
All-stock Dummy variable: 1 if deal is purely stock ﬁnanced, 0 otherwise.
Hostile Dummy variable: 1 if deal is reported as hostile, 0 otherwise.
Competing Dummy variable: 1 if there is a competing bidder, 0 otherwise.
Cross-border Dummy variable: 1 if target ﬁrm is not a US company, 0 otherwise.
Relative size Deal value over market value of acquirer at last ﬁscal year end.
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Variable Deﬁnition
(D) Director appointment characteristics
Appointment returns Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) measured over the 3-day window (−1, 1) around announcement,
using a market model approach.
Minority Dummy variable: 1 for ethnic minority outside directors, 0 otherwise.
Independent Dummy variable: 1 for independent outside directors, 0 otherwise.
Female Dummy variable: 1 for female outside directors, 0 otherwise.
Age Age of the director.
# Other directorships Number of other directorships that the director holds.
Foreign Dummy variable: 1 if the director’s country of employment is overseas, 0 otherwise.
Retired Dummy variable: 1 if the director is retired, 0 otherwise.
Executive Dummy variable: 1 if the director is an executive of another company, 0 otherwise.
Finance Dummy variable: 1 if the director works in the ﬁnance industry, 0 otherwise.
Consulting Dummy variable: 1 if the director works in the consulting industry, 0 otherwise.
Academic Dummy variable: 1 if the director is an academic, 0 otherwise.
Legal Dummy variable: 1 if the director works in the legal industry, 0 otherwise.
Non-proﬁt Dummy variable: 1 if the director works in the non-proﬁt industry, 0 otherwise.
Other Dummy variable: 1 if the director works in another occupation not listed above, 0 otherwise.
aDue to a reporting change in 2006, prior to 2006 our two measures are constructed with different ExecuComp items for stock and
option grants (items RSTKGRNT and OPTION AWARDS BLK VALUE), other pay (items OTHANN and ALLOTHTOT) and
non-equity incentives (item LTIP).
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